We analyze the optimal policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and firms choose which of several mutually exclsuive mergers to propose.
Introduction
The evaluation of proposed horizontal mergers involves a basic trade-off: mergers may increase market power, but may also create efficiencies. Whether a given merger should be approved depends, as first emphasized by Williamson (1968) , on a balancing of these two effects.
In most of the literature discussing horizontal merger evaluation, the assumption is that a merger should be approved if and only if it improves welfare, whether that be aggregate surplus or just consumer surplus, as is in practice the standard adopted by most antitrust authorities [see, e.g., Farrell and Shapiro (1993) , McAfee and Williams (1992) ]. This paper contributes to a small literature that formally derives optimal merger approval rules. This literature started with Besanko and Spulber (1993) , who discussed the optimal rule for an antitrust authority who cannot directly observe efficiencies but who recognizes that firms know this information and decide whether to propose a merger based on this knowledge. Other recent papers in this literature include Nocke and Whinston (2008) Ottavianni and Wickelgren (2009) , and Armstrong and Vickers (2010) .
In this paper, we focus on a setting in which one firm may merge with one of a number of other firms. These mergers are mutually exclusive, and each may result in a different postmerger cost level. The merger that is proposed is the result of a bargaining process among the * We thank members of the Toulouse Network for Information Technology and Nuffield College's economic theory lunch for their comments. Nocke gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation, as well as the hospitality of Northwestern University's Center for the Study of Industrial Organization. Whinston thanks the National Science Foundation, the Toulouse Network for Information Technology, and the Leverhulme Trust for financial support, as well as Nuffield College and the Oxford University Department of Economics for their hospitality.
firms. The antitrust authority observes the characteristics of the merger that is proposed, but neither the feasibility nor the characteristics of any mergers that are not proposed. We focus in the main part on an antitrust authority who wishes to maximize expected consumer surplus. Our main result characterizes the form of the antitrust authority's optimal policy, which we show should impose a tougher standard on mergers involving larger acquirers (in terms of their pre-merger share). Specifically, the minimal acceptable level of increase in consumer surplus is strictly positive for all but the smallest acquirer, and is larger the larger is the acquirer's premerger share.
The closest papers to our are Lyons (2003) and Armstrong and Vickers (2010) . Lyons first identifies the issue that arises when firms may choose which merger to propose. Armstrong and Vickers (2010) provide an elegant characterization of the optimal policy when mergers (or, more generally, projects that may be proposed by an agent) are ex ante identical in terms of their distributions of possible outcomes. Our paper differs from Armstrong and Vickers (2010) primarily in its focus on the optimal differential treatment of mergers that differ in this ex ante sense.
The paper is also related to Nocke and Whinston (2008) . That paper established conditions under which the optimal dynamic policy for an antitrust authority who wants to maximize discounted expected consumer surplus is a completely myopic policy, in which a merger is approved if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus at the time it is proposed. One of the important assumptions for that result was that potential mergers were "disjoint," in the sense that the set of firms involved in different possible mergers do not overlap. The present paper explores, in a static setting, the implications of relaxing that disjointness assumption, focusing on the polar opposite case in which all potential mergers are mutually exclusive.
The paper proceeds as follows: We describe the model in Section 1. Section 2 derives our main result, which characterizes the optimal policy in the case in which the proposed merger maximizes industry aggregate profit due to efficient bargaining among the firms. In Section 4 we show that our main characterization extends to some cases in which that bargaining is not efficient, including the case of the Segal (1999) offer game. Section 5 discusses some other extensions of our results, and Section 6 concludes.
The Model
We consider a homogeneous goods industry in which firms compete in quantities (Cournot competition). Let N = {0, 1, 2, ..., N } denote the (initial) set of firms. All firms have constant returns to scale; firm i's marginal cost is denoted c i . Inverse demand is given by P (Q). We impose standard assumptions on demand: Assumption 1. For all Q such that P (Q) > 0, we have:
It is well known that under these conditions there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in quantities. Moreover, this equilibrium is "stable" (each firm i's best-response function
j6 =i q j ) so that comparative statics are "well behaved" (if a subset of firms jointly produce less [more] because of a change in their incentives to produce output, then equilibrium industry output will fall [rise]). The vector of output levels in the pre-merger equilibrium is given by q 0 ≡ (q 0 0 , q 0 1 , ..., q 0 n ), where q 0 i is firm i's quantity. For simplicity, we assume that pre-merger marginal costs are such that all firms in N are "active" in the pre-merger equilibrium, i.e., q 0 i > 0 for all i. Aggregate output, price, consumer surplus, firm i's profit and aggregate profit in the pre-merger equilibrium are denoted
Suppose that there is a set of K potential mergers, each between firm 0 (the"target") and a single merger partner (an "acquirer") k ∈ K ⊆ N . There is a random variable φ k ∈ {0, 1} that determines the feasibility of the merger between firm 0 and firm k. If φ k = 1, the merger is feasible. A feasible merger is described by M k = (k, c k ), where k is the identity of the acquirer and c k the (realized) post-merger marginal cost, which is drawn from distribution function G k with support [l, h k ] and no mass points. The random draws of φ k and c k are independent across mergers. The set of feasible mergers is denoted F ≡ {M k : φ k = 1} ∪ M 0 , where M 0 denotes the status quo (or "null merger") resulting in outcome
and
and the induced change in aggregate profit is
As these mergers are mutually exclusive, at most one merger can be proposed to the antitrust authority. If merger M k , k ∈ F, is proposed, the antitrust authority can observe all aspects of that merger. We assume that the antitrust authority can commit ex ante to a merger-specific approval policy by specifying an approval set
the post-merger marginal cost levels that would lead to approval of merger k. Because of our assumption of full support and no mass points, we can without loss of generality restrict attention to the case where each A k is a (finite or infinite) union of closed intervals, i.e.,
Note that the status quo M 0 is always "approved."
Given the set of feasible mergers F and the antitrust authority's approval set A, the set of feasible mergers that would be approved if proposed is given by F ∩ A. A bargaining process amongst the firms determines which feasible merger is actually proposed. Note that this bargaining problem involves externalities as firms' payoffs depend on the identity of the acquirer. There are various ways in which one could model this situation. In much of the paper, we focus on the benchmark case in which bargaining is efficient from the viewpoint of the industry. That is, we assume for now that firms propose the merger M * (F, A) from the set of feasible and approvable mergers that maximizes aggregate profit, where for any set of mergers
There are several bargaining processes which could lead to joint profit maximization:
1. Multilateral "Coasian bargaining" under complete information amongst all firms would lead to an efficient (aggregate-profit maximizing) outcome.
2. Suppose the auctioneer (here, firm 0) conducts a "menu auction" in which each firm i ≥ 1 submits a nonnegative bid b i (M k ) ≥ 0 for each feasible and approvable merger M k ∈ (F ∩ A) with k ≥ 1. Firm 0 then selects the merger that maximizes its profit, where the profit from selecting merger M k is given by the sum of all bids for that merger,
, and the profit from selecting the null merger M 0 is π 0 (M 0 ). Bernheim and Whinston (1996) show that there is an efficient equilibrium which, in this setting, implements the merger that maximizes aggregate profit.
3. Suppose the target (firm 0) can commit to any sales mechanism. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) show that one such optimal mechanism has the following structure: As a compensation for implementing merger M k ∈ (F ∩ A), the principal (here, the target) requires
is the merger that minimizes firm i's profit. If a firm i does not make its payment, then the principal commits to proposing merger M i to the antitrust authority [who will then approve it since M i ∈ (F ∩ A)]. 1 Jehiel and Moldovanu show that there exists an equilibrium in which all firms participate in the mechanism. Given the set of feasible and approvable mergers, F ∩ A, the resulting outcome maximizes aggregate profit; that is, merger M * (F, A) is proposed. 2 In line with legal standards in the U.S. and many other countries, we assume that the antitrust authority acts in the consumers' interests. That is, the antitrust authority selects the approval set A that maximizes expected consumer surplus given that firms' proposal rule is M * (·):
where the expectation is taken with respect to the set of feasible mergers, F. (We discuss aggregate surplus maximization in Section 4.) We are interested in studying how the optimal approval set depends on the pre-merger characteristics of the alternative mergers. For this reason, we assume that the potential acquirers differ in terms of their pre-merger marginal costs. Without loss of generality, let 1 That is, similar to Bernheim and Whinston's (1996) menu auction, firms make payments even for mergers that they are not a party to.
2 To see this, note that the target's program can be written as:
But this is equivalent to max
K ≡ {1, ..., K} and re-label firms 1 through K in decreasing order of their pre-merger marginal costs: c 1 > c 2 > ... > c K . Thus, in the pre-merger equilibrium, firm k ∈ K produces more than firm j ∈ K, and has a larger market share, if k > j. We will say that merger M k is larger than merger M j if k > j as the combined pre-merger market share of firms 0 and k is larger than that of firms 0 and j.
Optimal Merger Policy with Efficient Bargaining
We now investigate the form of the antitrust authority's optimal policy when firms bargain efficiently to determine the merger that is proposed. Given a set of feasible mergers F and an approval set A, this bargaining results in the merger M * (F,A), as discussed in the previous section. We begin with some preliminary observations before turning to our main result.
Preliminaries
As firms produce a homogeneous good, a merger M k raises [reduces] consumer surplus if and only if it raises [reduces] aggregate output Q. The following lemma summarizes some useful properties of a CS-neutral merger M k , i.e., a merger that leaves consumer surplus unchanged,
1. the merger causes no changes in the output of any nonmerging firm i / ∈ {0, k} nor in the joint output of the merging firms 0 and k; 2. the merged firm's margin at the pre-and post-merger price P (Q • ) equals the sum of the merging firms' pre-merger margins:
3. the merger is profitable for the merging firms;
4. the merger increases the aggregate profit Π.
Proof. See Nocke and Whinston (2008) for a proof of parts (1)- (3). For part (4) , note that the merger raises the joint profit of the merging firms 0 and k by part (3) and it leaves the profit of any nonmerging firm unchanged (as neither price nor their output changes).
Rewriting equation (1), merger M k is CS-neutral if the post-merger marginal cost satisfies
A lower post-merger marginal cost induces a larger aggregate output, so that the merger is
An implication of (2), emphasized by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) , is that a CS-neutral merger must involve a reduction in marginal cost below the marginal cost level of the more efficient merger partner: i.e., M k can be CS-neutral only if c k < min{c 0 , c k }.
We next introduce an assumption on how reductions in post-merger marginal cost affect the aggregate profit Π:
reducing its post-merger marginal cost c k increases the aggregate profit Π.
As we now show, this assumption must hold for merger M k if whenever it is CS-nondecreasing we have b c k ≤ min l6 =k c l ; i.e., the merged firm has the lowest marginal cost. Since this would always be true were the firms in set N \{0} to have identical initial marginal costs, it clearly holds provided their initial marginal costs are sufficiently close. To see why Assumption 2 holds in this case, note that summing up the post-merger first-order conditions for profit maximization yields
where H ≡ P i∈N \{0} (s i ) 2 is the post-merger industry Herfindahl Index. Assumption 1 ensures that the first term,¯Q 2 P 0 (Q)¯, is increasing in Q. As reducing a firm's marginal cost leads to a larger Q, a sufficient condition for the claim to hold is that reducing the merged firm's marginal cost induces an increase in H. But this is indeed the case if the merged firm has lower costs, and hence a larger market share, than any of its (unmerged) rivals, since then a further reduction in its marginal cost increases its share and lowers the shares of all of its rivals, increasing H (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix).
To make the antitrust authority's problem interesting, and avoid certain degenerate cases we will henceforth assume the following:
Assumption 3: For all k ∈ K, the probability that the merger M k is CS-increasing is positive but less than one:
The following lemma gives a key result that indicates that there is a systematic bias in the proposal incentives of firms, relative to the interests of consumers, in favor of larger mergers: Lemma 2. Suppose two mergers, M j and M k , with k > j ≥ 1, induce the same non-negative change in consumer surplus, ∆CS(M j ) = ∆CS(M k ) ≥ 0. Then the larger merger M k induces a greater increase in aggregate profit:
Proof. From the discussion above, the post-merger joint profit of the firms is given by (3). As both mergers induce the same level of consumer surplus (and thus the same Q), the first term on the right hand side of (3) is the same for both mergers. It thus suffices to show that the larger merger M k induces a larger value of H than the smaller merger M j . Now, as both mergers induce the same Q, Assumption 1 implies that the output of any firm not involved in M j or M k is the same under both mergers. Hence,
Next, recall that a CS-nondecreasing merger increases the share of the merging firms and reduces the share of all nonmerging firms. Thus, we have
In addition, since total output is the same after both mergers and c k < c j , we also have
Hence, the distribution of market shares after the larger merger M k is a sum-preserving spread of those after the smaller merger M j :
By Lemma 3 in the Appendix, H is therefore larger after M k than after M j .
Assumptions 1-3 and Lemma 2 imply that the possible mergers can be represented as shown in Figure 1 (where the are four possible mergers; i.e., K = 4). In the figure, the change in the aggregate profit, ∆Π, is measured on the horizontal axis and the change in consumer surplus, ∆CS, is measured on the vertical axis. The CS-increasing mergers therefore are those lying above the horizontal axis. The aggregate profit and consumer surplus changes induced by a merger between firms 0 and k ≥ 1, (Π(M k ), CS(M k )), fall somewhere on the curve labeled "M k ." (The figure shows only the parts of these curves foe which the aggregate profit change ∆Π is nonnegative.) Since by Lemma 1 a CS-neutral merger involves a strictly positive change in aggregate profit, each curve crosses the horizontal axis to the right of the vertical axis. By Assumption 2, the curve for each merger M k with k ≥ 2 is upward sloping everywhere above the horizontal axis. By Lemma 2, above the horizontal axis the curves for larger mergers lie everywhere to the right of those for smaller mergers.
A useful corollary of Lemma 2, which can easily be seen in Figure 1 , is the following:
. But this implies (using Assumption 2 for the first inequality and Lemma 2 for the second) that
Optimal Merger Policy
We can now turn to the optimal policy of the antitrust authority. Recall that the antitrust authority can without loss restrict itself to approval sets in which the set of acceptable cost levels for a merger between firm 0 and each firm k, A k ⊆ [l, h k ], is a union of closed intervals. Throughout we restrict attention to such policies. 4 Let a k ≡ max{c k |c k ∈ A k } denote the largest allowable post-merger cost level for a merger (i.e., the "marginal merger") between firms 0 and k. Also let ∆CS k ≡ ∆CS(k, a k ) and ∆Π k ≡ ∆Π(k, a k ) denote the consumer surplus and aggregate profit levels in that marginal merger. These are the lowest levels of consumer surplus and (for k ≥ 2) aggregate profit in any allowable merger between firms 0 and k.
We now state our main result: Proposition 1. Any optimal approval policy A approves the smallest merger if and only if it is CS-nondecreasing, approves only mergers k ∈ K + ≡ {1, ..., b K} with positive probability ( b K may equal K) and satisfies 0 = ∆CS 1 < ∆CS 2 < ..
the lowest level of consumer surplus that is acceptable to the antitrust authority equals zero for the smallest merger M 1 , is strictly positive for every other merger M k with k > 1, and is monotonically increasing in the size of the merger, while the largest merger(s) may never be approved.
Proof. The proof proceeds in a number of steps.
Step 1. We observe first that an optimal policy does not approve CS-decreasing mergers. To see this, suppose the approval set A includes CS-decreasing mergers, and consider the set A + ⊆ A that removes any mergers in A that reduce consumer surplus. Figure 2 depicts such a pair of approval sets. Since this change only matters when the aggregate profit-maximizing merger M * (F,A) under set A is no longer approved under A + , the change in expected consumer surplus from this change in the approval policy equals Pr(M * (F,A) ∈ A\A + ), the probability of this event happening, times the conditional expectation
Since ∆CS(M * (F,A + )) is necessarily nonnegative by construction of A + , and
is strictly negative whenever M * (F,A) ∈ A\A + , this change is strictly positive.
Step 2. Next, any smallest merger M 1 that is CS-nondecreasing must be approved. To see this, suppose that the approval set is A but that 
By Corollary 1 and the fact that A 0 \A contains only smallest mergers (between firms 0 and (5) is strictly positive. This can be seen in Figure   3 . This implies in particular that ∆CS 1 = 0.
Step 3. Next, let K + denote those acquirers with k 6 = 1 for whom the probability of having a merger M k ∈ A is strictly positive. We claim that in any optimal policy ∆CS k > 0 for all k ∈ K + . To see this, consider switching from the policy A to A ε ≡ {M k ∈ A : k ∈ K + and ∆CS(M k ) > ε} where ε > 0, as shown in Figure 4 . The change in expected consumer surplus equals Pr(M * (F,A) ∈ A\A ε ) times
Now, as ε → 0, this conditional expectation approaches
which is strictly positive given steps 1 and 2.
Step 4. Next, we claim that in any optimal policy, for all k ∈ K + , ∆CS k must equal the expected change in consumer surplus from the next-most-profitable merger M * (F\(k, a k ),A), conditional on merger M k = (k, a k ) being the most profitable merger in F∩A. Defining the
expected change in consumer surplus from the next-most-profitable merger M * (F\M k ,A), conditional on merger M k = (k, c k ) being the most profitable merger in F∩A, to be
this means that
In Figure 5 the possible locations of the next-most-profitable merger when the most profitable merger is M 2 = (2, a 2 ) are shown as a shaded set. The quantity E A 2 (a 2 ) is the expectation of the change in consumer surplus for the merger that has the largest change in aggregate profit among mergers other than M 2 , conditional on all of these other mergers lying in the shaded region of the figure.
To see that (8) must hold for all k ∈ K + , suppose first that
For any ε > 0, the change in expected consumer surplus from changing from A to A ∪ A
This conditional expectation can be rewritten as
where c k 0 is the realized cost level in the aggregate profit-maximizing merger M * (F,A ∪ A ε k 0 ), which is a merger of firms 0 and k 0 when the conditioning statement is satisfied. By continuity
. For all such ε, the conditional expectation (10) is strictly positive so this change in the approval set would strictly increase expected consumer surplus. A similar argument applies if
Step 5. Next, we argue that for all j < k such that j, k ∈ K + it must be that ∆Π j ≤ ∆Π k ; that is, the aggregate profit change in the marginal merger by acquirer j must be no greater than the aggregate profit change in the marginal merger by any larger acquirer k. Figure 6 (a) shows a situation that violates this condition, where the marginal merger by acquirer 3 causes a smaller aggregate profit change ∆Π 3 , than the marginal merger by the smaller acquirer 2, ∆Π 2 . For j ∈ K + , let k 0 ≡ arg min k∈K + ,k>j ∆Π k and suppose that ∆Π k 0 < ∆Π j . We know from the previous step that 
The set A ε j is shown in Figure 6 (b). The change in expected consumer surplus from this change in the approval set equals Pr(M * (F,A∪A
where c j is the realized cost level in the aggregate profit-maximizing merger M * (F,A∪A ε j ), which is a merger of firms 0 and k 0 when the conditioning statement is satisfied. As ε → 0, the expected change in (11) converges to
where the inequality follows from Corollary 1 since ∆Π(j, c 0 j ) = ∆Π k 0 .
Step 6. We next argue that ∆CS j < ∆CS k for all j, k ∈ K + with j < k. Suppose otherwise;
i.e., for some j, h ∈ K + with h > j we have ∆CS j ≥ ∆CS h . Define k = arg min h∈K + ,h>j ∆Π h s.t.∆CS j ≥ ∆CS h . Figure 7 depicts such a situation where j = 2 and k = 3.
By Step 4, we must have
can be written as a weighted average of two conditional expectations:
(13) Expectation (12) conditions on the event that the next-most-profitable merger other than (k, a k ) has a profit change less than ∆Π j , the profit change in merger (j, a j ). Since no merger in A by either acquirer k or j can have such a profit level (since ∆Π k > ∆Π j by Step 5), the expectation (12) must exactly equal E A j (a j ). Now consider the expectation (13). If
for some l > j and l < k. Now, in case (i) it is immediate that ∆CS(M * (F\M k ,A) ≥ CS j , with strict inequality whenever c j = a j . In case (ii), the fact that ∆Π(l, c l ) ≥ ∆Π j implies by Corollary 1 that
In case (iii), (14) follows from the definition of k. Thus, expectation (13) must strictly exceed E A j (a j ), which leads to a contradiction.
Step 7. Finally, we argue that
follows because the profile of firms' costs following merger (k, l) are lower than following merger (k + 1, l) (the post-merger industry cost profile differs only for firms k and k + 1, which have costs of l and c k+1 with the first merger and c k and l with the second). Thus, if k + 1 ∈ K + , then ∆CS(k + 1, a k+1 ) < ∆CS(k, l). But, an argument like that in Step 7 [using the fact that, by an argument like that in Step 4,
, contradicting the conclusion of Step 4.
We have shown that there is a misalignment between firms' proposal incentives and the interests of the antitrust authority: firms tend to have an incentive to propose a merger that is larger (in terms of the pre-merger size of the merger partner) than the one that would maximize consumer surplus. To compensate for this intrinsic bias in firms' proposal incentives, the antitrust authority should optimally adopt a higher minimum CS-standard the larger is the proposed merger.
Cut-off Rules
In our analysis above, we have shown that the optimal approval policy has the property that the minimum CS-standard is zero for the smallest merger and increasing in the size of the proposed merger. Does this mean that any merger that generates a larger increase in consumer surplus than the minimum CS-standard would get approved? Put differently, does the optimal policy have a cut-off structure so that A k = [l, a k ]? It turns out that the answer depends on whether nor not the merger partners can under-report the efficiency gains induced by their merger.
Consider first the case where the antitrust authority observes the efficiency gain of any proposed merger. In that case, the optimal approval policy may not have a cut-off structure, as the following example illustrates. (For simplicity, the example considers the case where, contrary to the assumption of the model, one of the mergers has a finite support of postmerger marginal costs. But the same insight would obtain if we perturbed the example and assumed that the support is continuous with no atoms.) Example 1. Suppose that there are two possible mergers, M 1 and M 2 . The smaller merger, M 1 , is always feasible. Its post-merger marginal cost is either c 1 = l or c 1 = h 1 , where the probability on the latter is 0.9. The corresponding changes in consumer surplus and aggregate profit are given by (∆CS(1, l) , ∆Π(1, l)) = (5, 5) and (∆CS (1, h 1 ), ∆Π(1, h 1 )) = (1, 1) . The unconditional expected increase in consumer surplus from approving M 1 is thus equal to 4.6. The post-merger marginal cost of the larger merger, M 2 , has a continuous support [l, h 2 ] with no atoms, satisfying ∆CS(2, h 2 ) < 1 and 5 < ∆CS(2, l). It is straightforward to verify that the optimal approval policy A * is such that Consider now the case where firms can under-report (but not over-report) any realizable efficiency gain. That is, suppose the merger partners can claim any level of post-merger marginal costc k ≥ c k , where c k is the true marginal cost level when the merger is implemented, and that the antitrust authority cannot or does not verify the actual marginal cost level ex post. (The idea might be that the antitrust authority cannot directly observe potential cost savings but requires documentation from the merger partners. While this documentation might be hard information, the firms may under-report potential efficiencies by providing documentation on only a subset of possible cost-saving measures. Ex post, the merged firm may always claim that the additional efficiencies were unexpected.) In this case, the optimal policy trivially has a cut-off structure: if the actual post-merger marginal cost level c k is such that the merger would not get approved even though c k < a k , the merger partners would have an incentive to claim that the actual post-merger marginal cost level is higher, say a k , and get the merger approved.
If, for whatever reason, the approval policy does have a cut-off structure, then the optimal cut-offs can be constructed recursively. Let
} denote the sets of feasible and allowable mergers not larger than M t . The optimal cut-offs (a 1 , ..., a K ) are recursively defined as follows:
Inefficient Bargaining Processes
In our analysis so far, we have focused on the benchmark case where the bargaining process between firms is efficient from the viewpoint of the industry. In this section, we explore two inefficient bargaining processes. First, we consider the case where there is (efficient) bargaining only between a subset of firms (including all of those firms that are involved in potential mergers). Second, we consider the case where the target (firm 0) can put itself up for sale by making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a single acquirer of its choosing, which is the "offer game" of Segal (1999) . We show that, in both cases, the main result continues to hold: the optimal approval policy has the property that the minimum CS-standard is increasing in the size of the proposed merger.
Bargaining Between a Subset of Firms
Suppose that the outcome of the bargaining process maximizes the joint profit of only a subset of firms, L, that includes the target and all of the acquirers, i.e.,
We claim that Proposition 1 carries over to this bargaining process: the optimal approval policy A is such that the minimum CS-standard is zero for the smallest merger and increasing in the size of the proposed merger, 0 = ∆CS 1 < ∆CS 2 < · · · < ∆CS K , where b K is the largest merger that is approved with positive probability. The key step in proving this claim is the following observation: If any CS-nondecreasing merger or any reduction in a merged firm's marginal cost induces an increase in aggregate profit, ∆Π > 0, then it also induces an increase in the joint profit of the firms in set L, ∆Π L > 0. To see this, note that both a CS-nondecreasing merger and a reduction in a firm's post-merger marginal cost weakly reduce the profit of any other firm, including the firm(s) not in set L, i.e., ∆Π N \L ≤ 0. Hence,
This observations has several implications. First, it means that Lemma 4, part 4, continues to hold if we replace aggregate profit Π by Π L . Second, it also means that Assumption 2 implies that a reduction in the post-merger marginal cost c k raises the joint profit of the firms in set L, Π L . Third, a similar type of argument implies that Lemma 2 continues to hold if we replace the induced change in industry profit, ∆Π(M l ), l = j, k, by the induced change in the joint profit of the firms in L, ∆Π L (M l ). To see this, recall that both mergers in the statement of the lemma, M j and M k , induce (by assumption) the same change in consumer surplus. Hence, the profit of any firm i 6 = j, k is the same under both mergers, so that
Finally, it is straightforward to see that all of the remaining steps in the proof of Proposition 1 carry over if we replace
The Offer Game
Suppose the bargaining process takes the form of an offer game, as in Segal (1999) , where the target (firm 0) makes public take-it-or-leave-it offers. In Segal (1999) , the principal's offers consist of a profile of trades x = (x 1 , ..., x K ) with x k the trade of agent k. Here, x k ∈ {0, 1}, where x k = 1 if the target proposes a merger with firm k. Specifically, suppose firm 0 can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer t k to a single firm k of its choosing, where k is such that M k ∈ (F ∩ A) . If the offer is accepted by firm k, then merger M k is proposed to the antitrust authority, who will approve it since M k ∈ (F ∩ A), and firm k acquires the target in return for the transfer payment t k . If the offer is rejected, or if no offer is made, then no merger is proposed and no payments are made.
Let
denote the change in the bilateral profit to the merging parties, firms 0 and k, induced by merger M k . Given the set of feasible and approvable mergers, the proposed merger in the equilibrium of the offer game is M * B (F, A), where
That is, the proposed merger M k is the one that maximizes the induced change in the bilateral profit to firms 0 and k, provided that change is positive; otherwise, no merger is proposed.
In the following, we show that Proposition 1 carries over to this bargaining process: the optimal approval policy A is such that the minimum CS-standard is zero for the smallest merger and increasing in the size of the proposed merger, 0 = ∆CS 1 < ∆CS 2 < · · · < ∆CS K , where b K is the largest merger that is approved with positive probability. The key steps in proving this result are the following. First, from the proof of part 4 of Lemma 1, it follows that a CS-neutral merger M k , k ≥ 1, raises the joint profit of the merger partners 0 and k, i.e., ∆Π B (M k ) > 0. Second, it is straightforward to verify that our conditions on demand (Assumption 1) ensure that reducing the merged firm's marginal cost b c k not only increases consumer surplus but also the merged firm's profit. This means that we can dispense with Assumption 2 as its bilateral-profit analog is implied by Assumption 1. Third, we obtain the following analog of Lemma 2:
Lemma 2. Suppose two mergers, M j and M k , with j < k, induce the same non-negative change in consumer surplus, ∆CS(M j ) = ∆CS(M k ) ≥ 0. Then, the larger merger M k induces a greater increase in the bilateral profit of the merger partners: ∆Π B (M k ) > ∆Π B (M j ) > 0.
Proof. Suppose otherwise that ∆Π B (M k ) ≤ ∆Π B (M j ), i.e.,
Using the first-order conditions of profit maximization, the term on the r.h.s. of equation (15) can be re-written as
As both mergers induce the same aggregate output (i.e., Q(M j ) = Q(M k )), the term on the l.h.s. of equation (15) can similarly be re-written as
Next, we claim that
To see this, let Q ≡ Q(M j ) = Q(M k ) the level of aggregate output after either merger. Summing up the N first-order conditions of profit maximization after merger M l , l = j, k, we obtain
It follows that c i + c l , i, l = j, k, i 6 = l, is the same under either merger, proving the claim. Combining these observations, we can re-write equation (15) as
Now, as merger M l , l = j, k, is CS-nondecreasing by assumption, the merger induces a weak increase in the joint output of the merger partners and a weak decrease in the output of any other firm i 6 = 0, l. That is,
and thus resulting in a contradiction. Hence, equation (15) cannot hold.
The final step consists in noting that all of the remaining steps in the proof of Proposition 1 continue to hold if we replace the change in aggregate profit, ∆Π(M k ), by the change in the merging firms' bilateral profit, ∆Π B (M k ). Proof. Without loss of generality, take r = 1 and define ∆ n ≡ s 0 n − s 00 n for n > 1. Observe that ∆ n ≥ 0 for all n > 1 and ∆ n > 0 for some n > 
and strictly positive if ∆ n+1 > 0. Since ∆ n+1 > 0 for some n ≥ 1, the result follows.
